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The hundred-day bloodletting in Rwanda from April through July 1994, which took more than 
500,000 lives, represented one of the moral low points of the twentieth century. In a speech of March 
1998, delivered on the tarmac at Kigali airport, U.S. President Bill Clinton acknowledged that the 
“international community, together with nations in Africa, must bear its share of responsibility for 
this tragedy.” Clinton declared that “all over the world there were people like me sitting in offices, 
day after day after day, who did not fully appreciate the depth and the speed with which you were 
being engulfed by this unimaginable terror.”1
Most scholarship on the Rwandan genocide has rejected such claims that international 
observers did not know, or “did not fully appreciate,” what was going on in Rwanda before and 
during the genocide. As Samantha Power observes in her book “A Problem from Hell”: America and 
the Age of Genocide:
Ahead of the April 6 plane crash [in Kigali that killed Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana 
and triggered the genocide], the United States ignored extensive early warnings about 
imminent mass violence. It denied Belgian requests to reinforce the peacekeeping mission. 
When the massacres started, not only did the Clinton administration not send troops to contest 
the slaughter, but it refused countless other options. President Clinton did not convene a 
single meeting of his senior foreign policy advisers to discuss U.S. options for Rwanda.2
Many commentators have asserted that, during the months leading up to April 1994, 
international observers grasped clearly the gravity and imminence of the threat of genocide in 
Rwanda. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) official inquiry, Rwanda: The Preventable 
Genocide, is typical in this regard:
There can be not an iota of doubt that the international community knew the following: that 
something terrible was underway in Rwanda, that serious plans were afoot for even more 
appalling deeds, that these went far beyond routine thuggery, and that the world nevertheless 
stood by and did nothing…. There were a thousand early warnings that something appalling 
was about to occur in Rwanda. If not a genocide, it was at least a catastrophe of so great a 
magnitude that it should command international intervention.3
1 Clinton, President Bill. “Address to Genocide Survivors at the Airport in Kigali, Rwanda,” 25 March 1998. Available 
from: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/text-of-clintons-rwanda-speech/ (accessed 14 January 2016).
2 Power, Samantha. 2002.“A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide. New York: Basic Books, 334-35.
3 Organization of African Unity (OAU) International Panel of Eminent Personalities, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, 
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According to this line of analysis, the key obstacle to effective preventive action was not the failure 
to comprehend the danger, but rather the inability of working-level diplomats and intelligence 
analysts to draw the attention of senior policymakers to the crisis, and—after April 6—the lack of 
“political will” for a robust response to the genocide.4 In Power’s words:
Simply put, American leaders did not act because they did not want to. They believed that 
genocide was wrong, but they were not prepared to invest the military, financial, diplomatic, 
or domestic political capital needed to stop it.5
A few scholars, however, have argued that the absence of knowledge—or perhaps the presence 
of the wrong kind of knowledge—about the unfolding events in Rwanda did indeed play a critical 
role in shaping responses to the genocide by the U.S. government and other international actors. 
One of the earliest retrospective inquiries into this topic, published in 1996 by the OECD Steering 
Committee for Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, concluded that on the eve of 
the genocide:
There were significant signs that forces in Rwanda were preparing the climate and structures 
for genocide and political assassinations. However, people both in the region and the 
broader international community ignored, discounted or misinterpreted the significance of 
these signs, thereby not only indicating an unwillingness to intervene, but communicating 
that unwillingness to those who were planning genocide.6
According to the Steering Committee, international policymakers’ perceptions of the situation in 
Rwanda on the eve of the genocide were colored by two events of the previous year. The first of 
these events was the signing of the Arusha Accords of August 1993, which had set the terms of a 
peace settlement between Rwanda’s Hutu ruling coalition and the Tutsi insurgency of the Rwandan 
7 July 2000, Ch. 9, par. 1 and 16, Available from: http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/rwanda-the-preventable-genocide 
(accessed 14 January 2016).
4 See for example Prunier, Gérard. 1995. The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. New York: Columbia University Press; 
Keane, Fergal. 1995. Season of Blood: A Rwandan Journey. London: Viking; Castonguay, Jacques. 1998. Les casques bleus 
au Rwanda. Paris: Harmattan; Des Forges, Alison. 1999. “Leave None to Tell the Story”: Genocide in Rwanda. New York: 
Human Rights Watch; Adelman, Howard and Astri Suhrke.1999. The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda 
to Zaire. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers; Melvern, Linda. 2000. A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in 
Rwanda’s Genocide. London: Zed Books; Melvern, Linda. 2004. Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide. London: Verso; 
Gourevitch, Philip. 1998. We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda. New 
York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux; Grünfeld, Fred and Anke Huijboom. 2007. The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda: The 
Role of Bystanders. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV; Power, A Problem from Hell; Leader, Joyce E. 2001. Rwanda’s Struggle for 
Democracy and Peace, 1991-1994. Washington, D.C: The Fund for Peace; Dallaire, Roméo. 2003. Shake Hands with the Devil: 
The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. Toronto: Random House Canada; Marchal, Luc. 2001. Rwanda: La descente aux enfers: 
témoignage d’un peacekeeper, décembre 1993-avril 1994. Brussels: Editions Labor; Feil, Scott. 1998. Preventing Genocide: How 
the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. New York: 
Carnegie Corporation of New York; Straus, Scott. 2006. The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press; Official inquiries into international responses to the genocide include: the UN Report of The 
Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and Statement of the Secretary-
General on Receiving the Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in 
Rwanda, 15 December 1999, available from: http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/1999/1257 (accessed 14 
January 2015), France’s Rapport d’Information sur les opérations militaires menées par la France, d’autres pays et l’ONU au 
Rwanda entre 1990 et 1994, available from: http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dossiers/rwanda/r1271.asp (accessed 14 
January 2016); the report of the Belgian Parliamentary commission of inquiry regarding the events in Rwanda, 6 December 1997, 
available from: http://www.senate.be/english/rwanda.html (accessed 14 January 2016); and the Organization of African 
Unity’s report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide. 
5 Power, Samantha. A Problem from Hell, 508. At a 2014 conference co-sponsored by the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum 
and the Hague Institute for Global Justice, many of the speakers reiterated the view that Western diplomats and other 
international observers familiar with Rwanda fully recognized the risks of genocide in the country. See Colum Lynch, 
“Exclusive: Rwanda Revisited,” Foreign Policy, 5 April 2015. Available from: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/05/rwanda-
revisited-genocide-united-states-state-department/ (accessed 12 January 2016). 
6 Eriksson, John et al. 1996. The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, Synthesis 
Report. Copenhagen: OECD Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March, 9.
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Patriotic Front (RPF); the second was the disastrous “Blackhawk Down” incident of October 1993, 
which had resulted in the deaths of eighteen U.S. Special Forces soldiers in Somalia, provoking fears 
among American political leaders concerning the dangers of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa:
There existed an internal predisposition on the part of a number of the key actors to deny 
the possibility of genocide because facing the consequences might have required them to 
alter their course of action. The mesmerization with the success of Arusha and the failure of 
Somalia together cast long shadows and distorted an objective analysis of Rwanda.7
This emphasis on the cognitive biases of international actors is also found in Michael Barnett’s 
book Eyewitness to a Genocide, which recounts the story of the internal struggles within the United 
Nations about how to respond to the Rwandan genocide. Barnett emphasizes that the bureaucratic 
culture of the UN limited the capacity of its officials to perceive events in Rwanda clearly: 
Government officials and UN staff came to know Rwanda as members of bureaucracies; the 
bureaucratic culture situated and defined their knowledge, informed their goals and desires, 
shaped what constituted appropriate and inappropriate behavior, distinguished acceptable 
from unacceptable consequences, and helped determine right from wrong.8
During the initial weeks after the outbreak of the genocide, Barnett writes, UN Security Council 
officials “were operating under the influence of uncertainty and organizationally scripted 
descriptions of the violence as a civil war with unfortunate civilian killings, not a prelude to 
genocide.”9
This essay revisits the debate over whether the international response to the Rwandan genocide 
was hampered principally by failures of political will, or by failures of comprehension as well. I 
address the question of how U.S. government officials analyzed the crisis in Rwanda during the 
months leading up to the genocide—and whether there may have been missed opportunities for 
effective preventive action that could have averted mass violence.
Although the U.S. government was not the only, nor even the most heavily invested, external 
power involved in the Rwanda crisis, it played a key role in shaping international responses to the 
events that preceded the genocide. U.S. diplomats actively sought to end the war that had begun in 
October 1990 with the invasion of a Tutsi exile army from Uganda, and the U.S. helped broker the 
Arusha Accords of August 1993. Even more important, as the only superpower left standing after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. dominated discussions over how to redefine not only its 
own foreign policy objectives, but also those of its NATO allies and the United Nations, vis-à-vis 
political developments in Africa. 
This paper limits its focus to U.S. government policy toward Rwanda before April 6, 1994, 
excluding from consideration the question of how U.S. officials responded to the genocide after 
it had begun. It draws on declassified U.S. government documents, obtained through Freedom of 
Information Act requests by the National Security Archive at the George Washington University, 
and on retrospective interviews with key working-level U.S. officials who were involved in 
formulating and implementing U.S. policy toward Central Africa from 1990 through the eve of the 
genocide in April 1994. 
7 Ibid, 19. See also Suhrke, Astri and Bruce Jones. 2000. “Preventive Diplomacy in Rwanda: Failure to Act or Failure of 
Actions?” in Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post–Cold War World. Edited by Bruce 
Jentleson. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 241. “The failure to recognize the transformation of the conflict from civil 
war to genocide and to anticipate the escalation in victims and, equally, the failure to possibly nip the genocide in the bud 
at two points in time, constitute the most critical missed opportunities of the Rwanda case.”
8 Barnett, Michael N. 2002. Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 7.
9 Ibid, 14. Gregory Brazeal echoes Barnett’s arguments, citing the work of Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow on 
bureaucratic decision-making processes: 1999. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd edition, New York: 
Addison-Wesley, 4-6. According to Brazeal, responses to genocide by the U.S. government “follow standardized routines, 
bureaucrats operate according to a ‘logic of appropriateness’ rather than a ‘logic of consequence,’ and seemingly irrational 
results often follow when a bureaucracy is confronted with a problem for which it has no preset response.” 
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Several key findings emerge from this research. Perhaps most strikingly, I conclude that before 
April 1994, virtually no U.S. diplomats or intelligence analysts working on Central Africa anticipated 
the scope of the violence that erupted that month. Their worst-case scenarios generally envisioned the 
resumption of a war between the Hutu-dominated government and the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic 
Front resulting in tens of thousands of deaths—more than an order of magnitude less than the 
actual toll of the genocide. This near-universal misperception of the nature and scope of the threat 
had fatal consequences for Rwanda’s Tutsi.
Two key factors inhibited the capacity of U.S. government analysts and policymakers to 
comprehend and respond to the imminent catastrophe brewing in Rwanda:
• The use of a faulty cognitive frame that failed to differentiate between threats of civil war 
and genocide, leading U.S. officials to underestimate the virulence of the threat to Tutsi 
civilians.
• The adoption of rigid policy guidance stressing the need to achieve a formal power-sharing 
agreement for Rwanda—and the continuing insistence on staying this diplomatic course 
despite indications that the implementation of the power-sharing arrangement mandated 
by the Arusha Accords would exacerbate rather than alleviate the conflicts between rival 
factions in Rwanda. 
After assessing the impact of these factors on U.S. intelligence analysis and diplomacy toward 
Rwanda, the paper examines the policy implications of this case study. It concludes by discussing 
the continuing relevance of the lessons of Rwanda for U.S. and international responses to 
contemporary threats of genocide and mass atrocities.
Rwanda on the Brink of Genocide, 1990-1993 
In October 1993, less than a week after the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers in the Blackhawk Down 
incident in Somalia, President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda visited Washington, D.C. to meet 
with Secretary of State Warren Christopher and other top U.S. government officials. A report 
published in March 1993 by an international commission of inquiry had accused Habyarimana and 
his entourage of sponsoring a “deliberate policy” aimed at “inciting Rwandans to hate and attack 
each other,” and of permitting extremist militias to “terrorize people in many parts of the country 
with no effective reaction from the officials responsible to public security.”10 In August 1993, the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Summary, Arbitrary, and Extrajudicial Executions had issued a report 
that largely confirmed this commission’s findings, concluding that the UN Genocide Convention 
“might … be considered to apply to” the massacres committed over the past three years, which had 
claimed the lives of more than 2,000 Tutsi.11
But, in meeting with Habyarimana that October, Secretary Christopher expressed no concerns 
about human rights abuses by the Rwandan regime. Instead he applauded the Rwandan president 
for his “great courage” in having signed the Arusha Accords of August 1993, which had settled a 
three-year war between the Hutu-dominated Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF), an insurgency of expatriate Tutsi who had lived as refugees in Uganda. Christopher 
“expressed…satisfaction” with the recent UN Security Council vote to create a Rwanda 
peacekeeping mission, and he articulated his hope that the peacekeepers would “be very effective” 
in implementing the Accords.12 
10 Report of the International Commission on Human Rights Abuses in Rwanda since October 1, 1990, March 1993. Available from: 
https://www.hrw.org/report/1993/03/01/report-international-commission-investigation-human-rights-violations-rwanda 
(accessed 14 January 2016).
11 OAU Report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities, Ch. 9, p. 64; United Nations Economic and Social 
Council, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, “Report by Mr. B. W. Ndiaye, Special Rapporteur, on his mission to Rwanda 
from 8 to 17 April 1993,” 11 August 1993, E/CN.4/1994/7/Add. 1, 22-23.
12 U.S. Department of State, cable State 313040, “President Habyarimana and Secretary Christopher Discuss Peace Process 
and Challenges Ahead,” 14 October 1993, Rwanda Genocide Collection (compiled 1998-2003), National Security  
Archive, Washington, DC, available from: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/Rw27.pdf (accessed  
14 January 2016).
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Christopher’s optimism reflected the views expressed in other State Department policy papers 
and cable traffic from this period. In June 1993, nine months before the outbreak of genocide, a policy 
memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose had described “the 
reconciliation process” in Rwanda as one of six “realizable goals” for U.S. policy toward Africa in 
the coming year. “Real progress has been registered,” the memo declared. “Prospects are good that 
Rwanda, a volatile, heavily populated country with a history of extreme ethnic violence, can move 
into nation-building during the next year.”13
In late January 1994, the State Department released its annual Country Report on Human 
Rights Practices for Rwanda in 1993. The report concluded:
Human rights abuses that plagued the first quarter of 1993 diminished considerably as the 
peace process progressed… Those abuses stemmed from dissatisfaction on the part of the 
former sole party, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND), over 
the power-sharing arrangement agreed to on January 9 between the multiparty Government 
and the RPF.14
As late as 1 April 1994—six days before the genocide erupted in Kigali—the new U.S. 
Ambassador to Rwanda, David Rawson, sent a reporting cable to Washington expressing cautious 
optimism about the political situation in Rwanda, tinged by concern about a possible return to war:
A round of Good Friday calls to observers, the UN and key players suggests that the sides 
are inching towards each other, but afraid to make the final offer. Many observers believe 
the installation of institutions will have to await the Arusha summit on Burundi…Our major 
fear is that the relative calm which has characterized Kigali the last couple of weeks will not 
hold until then. I have urged all my interlocutors to use every influence at their disposal to 
encourage calm as we approach this last turn on the course.15 
The war of 1990-1993 was the outgrowth of a long and bitter polarization of relations between 
Rwanda’s majority Hutu and minority Tutsi ethnic groups. In the pre-colonial era, the rulers 
had been drawn from the pastoralist Tutsi, rather than the agriculturalist Hutu, but these ethnic 
distinctions had been fluid and permeable. Under German colonial rule beginning in the 1880s, and 
especially after Belgium seized control of Rwanda after World War I, the distinction between Hutu 
and Tutsi became hardened as the Europeans redefined these essentially social categories in racial 
terms. German and Belgian colonial administrators relied on Tutsi surrogates to rule Rwanda, 
viewing the Tutsi as an aristocratic race with Caucasoid features, and in the 1920s the Belgian 
administrators issued racial identity cards that permanently fixed Rwandans’ ethnic identities.
The Hutu emancipation movement of the late 1950s, led by Grégoire Kayibanda, represented 
a rebellion against Tutsi social domination as well as Belgian colonial rule. From the onset of the 
independence struggle in 1959 through the immediate aftermath of Rwandan independence in 
1962, more than 20,000 people died in political violence and 150,000—perhaps half of Rwanda’s 
Tutsi population—fled to neighboring countries including Uganda and Burundi. 
Neighboring Burundi, whose population had an ethnic composition similar to Rwanda’s—
but where the minority Tutsi ruled the country after independence—also experienced massive 
intercommunal violence during this era. In 1972, between 100,000 and 300,000 Burundian Hutu 
were massacred, and thousands of Hutu refugees fled to Rwanda. Taking advantage of the ensuing 
13 U.S. Department of State, Information Memorandum from George E. Moose through Mr. Tarnoff to the Secretary, 
“The African Agenda During the Next Twelve Months: Realizable Goals and Perceived Pitfalls”, 18 June 1993, Rwanda 
Genocide Collection (compiled 1998-2003), National Security Archive, Washington, DC.
14 U.S. Department of State, “Rwanda Human Rights Practices, 1993,” in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 
1993, 31 January1994, Rwanda Genocide Collection (compiled 1998-2003), National Security Archive, Washington, DC.
15 U.S. Department of State, cable Kigali 01458, “Negotiations Slide Into Long Weekend,” 1 April 1994, Rwanda Genocide 
Collection (compiled 1998-2003), National Security Archive, Washington, DC. Available from: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/Rw02.pdf (accessed 14 January 2016).
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chaos, Rwandan army Maj. Gen. Juvenal Habyarimana, a Belgian-trained paratrooper from 
Northern Rwanda, overthrew President Kayibanda (who had favored the interests of Southern 
Hutus) in 1973. For the next eighteen years, Habyarimana presided over a stable, autocratic, and 
increasingly ossified regime in which a Northern Hutu elite maintained its monopoly on power.16
In 1990, this regime began to unravel. Under pressure from France and other Western aid 
donors, Habyarimana announced a program of political reforms in July 1990. These reforms 
included the transition to a multi-party system by 1992, a referendum on a national political charter 
by June 1991, the end of compulsory membership in his National Revolutionary Movement for 
Development (MRND) party, the end of ethnic identification on national identity cards, and the 
peaceful return of refugees. The issue of refugee return was particularly problematic. By 1990, 
more than 400,000 Rwandan Tutsi refugees were living in Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania, and 
the host governments were placing increasing pressure on these refugee communities. But as the 
most densely populated country in Africa, Rwanda was ill-equipped to absorb a large influx of 
repatriated refugees, especially in light of the economic hardship caused by the economic austerity 
program imposed on Rwanda by the International Monetary Fund and by the collapse of global 
commodity prices during the early 1990s. Habyarimana’s democratization program extended no 
political rights to Rwandan Tutsi living as refugees outside the country’s borders.
On 1 October 1990, approximately 2,000 Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) rebels, mainly Rwandan 
Tutsi refugees serving in Uganda’s National Resistance Army, invaded northeast Rwanda from 
Uganda. With French and Belgian military assistance, Rwandan government forces halted the initial 
RPF assault. But the U.S. and other donor governments recognized the intractable nature of the 
conflict and pressed Habyarimana toward negotiations to reach a power-sharing agreement. In the 
summer of 1991, Habyarimana set forth a new constitution in order to effect political reforms, the 
national assembly passed a law allowing the formation of political parties, and shortly thereafter 
five parties registered with the government and began meetings and demonstrations. In early 1992, 
hard-line members of the president’s party founded a Hutu-supremacist party, the Coalition for 
the Defense of the Republic (CDR), which began lobbying for inclusion in the government. Under 
pressure from Western donors, in April 1992 Habyarimana named a prime minister from the MDR, 
the primary opposition party, who then formed a five-party coalition government that limited 
Habyarimana’s power over routine governmental affairs.
In peace talks hosted by Tanzania and attended by American, French, and other international 
representatives, the transitional government concluded several protocols with RPF representatives 
collectively known as the Arusha Accords, which were signed by Habyarimana and RPF Chairman 
Alexis Kanyarengwe in August 1993. The Accords stipulated the establishment of a 22-month broad-
based transitional government (BBTG) within 37 days; elections by the end of 1995; the return of 
exiles, refugees and displaced persons; the integration of FAR and RPF forces; the integration and 
reduction of the Presidential Guard and other elite forces; and a Neutral International Force (NIF) 
to maintain peace. But African leaders witnessing the signing were skeptical about the viability 
of the agreement, and there was no celebration in Kigali. Almost immediately, the Accords’ 
transition process deadlocked, as the various players presented slates of ministerial candidates 
and maneuvered for position and influence.17
Even as the rival factions in Rwanda jockeyed for advantage, the member states of the 
UN Security Council in New York locked horns over the establishment of the NIF. The Arusha 
Accords had stipulated that the NIF would carry out a wide range of security tasks, including 
guaranteeing the overall security of the country, maintaining law and order, tracking arms caches 
and neutralizing armed gangs throughout the country, and determining security parameters for 
Kigali with the objective of making it a neutral zone. Under pressure from the U.S. and other 
member states, the Security Council scaled back both the size and the mandate of the United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), authorizing a force of 2,548 peacekeepers 
charged with the responsibilities to “contribute to the security of the city of Kigali inter alia within 
16 OAU International Panel of Eminent Personalities, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, Ch. 8, “The Arusha Peace Process,” 
15-33.
17 Ibid, 34-53; Suhrke and Jones, “Preventive Diplomacy in Rwanda.”
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a weapons-secure area established by the parties in and around the city,” to “monitor observance 
of the cease-fire agreement,” and to “monitor the security situation during the final period of the 
transitional government’s mandate, leading up to the elections.”18
In October 1993, before the broad-based transitional government could be established in 
Rwanda, neighboring Burundi’s first elected Hutu president was assassinated by Tutsi military 
officers. The subsequent two months witnessed a massive bloodletting in which 30,000 to 50,000 
Burundian Hutu and Tutsi died in intercommunal violence and 250,000 refugees fled the country. 
The massacres in Burundi eviscerated what little trust and good will remained between rival Hutu 
and Tutsi political factions in Rwanda, dealing a fatal blow to the already shaky prospects for the 
implementation of the Arusha Accords.
The Limits of Foreknowledge: U.S. Conflict Analysis on the Eve of Genocide
Proponents of the view that U.S. officials surely must have known about the impending genocide 
have ample ammunition to support their claims. Various diplomats and other international 
observers had urgently warned of the threat of violence in Rwanda. Canadian law professor 
Professor William Schabas, a member of the International Commission of Inquiry that visited 
Rwanda in January 1993, describes the political climate that he and the other members of the 
Commission encountered:
[F]aced with convincing evidence of mass killings (i.e., tens to hundreds at a time) of Tutsis, 
accompanied by public incitement whose source could be traced to the highest levels of the 
ruling oligarchy, the word “genocide” sprang inexorably to our lips. . . . In a press release 
issued the day after our departure from Rwanda, we spoke of genocide and warned of the 
abyss into which the country was heading.19
On 11 January 1994, three months before the genocide erupted, the Force Commander of the UN 
Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), Maj. Gen. Romeo Dallaire, faxed UN headquarters in New York 
to relay information from an informant who worked as a trainer for the President’s party militia. 
After providing details of the militia’s direct connections to the President’s party and the Rwandan 
Army, Dallaire’s informant reported: “Since UNAMIR mandate he has been ordered to register all 
Tutsi in Kigali. He suspects it is for their extermination. Example he gave was that in 20 minutes his 
personnel could kill up to 1000 Tutsis.”20 
The following month, Dallaire reported that time was “running out for political discussions” 
and “any spark on the security side could possibly have catastrophic consequences.”21 Following 
the assassination of two leading government officials in late February, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, 
the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Rwanda, declared that the “general 
situation is observed to be explosive.”22 In a letter to the UN Security Council, the Belgian Foreign 
Ministry urged that the peacekeeping force in Rwanda be reinforced. It warned, “The political 
assassinations, the ensuing unrest, and the worsening of the climate of safety, could well lead to 
18 Hilaire, Max. 2015. Waging Peace: The United Nations Security Council and Transnational Armed Conflicts. Berlin: Logos 
Verlag, 70-72; UN Security Council Resolution 872, October 5, 1993. Available from: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB452/docs/doc01.pdf (accessed 14 January 2016).
19 Schabas, William A. 2000. Genocide in International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, x.
20 Facsimile from Maj. Gen. Romeo Dallaire, Force Commander, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, to Maj. 
Gen. Maurice Baril, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Request for Protection for Informant,” 11 
January 1994. See also U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, “The Genocide Fax,” 2014. Available from: http://www.ushmm.
org/confront-genocide/cases/rwanda/turning-points/genocide-fax-part-i (accessed 14 January 2016).
21 Bloomfield, Sara J. and Michael Abramowitz, “Don’t Assume that the Rwandan Genocide Couldn’t Happen Today,” 
New Republic, 7 April 2014. Available from: http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117285/rwanda-genocide-20-year-
anniversary-what-have-we-learned: (accessed 14 January 2016).
22 Booh-Booh, Jacques-Roger. Situation Report of 23 February 1994. In Jake Freyer and Emily Willard, editors, “Sitreps 
Detail Rwanda’s Descent into Genocide 1994: Complete Collection of Peacekeepers’ Situation Reports from Rwanda to 
UN Headquarters in New York,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 466, 7 April 2014. Available from: 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB466/ (accessed 14 January 2016).
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a new bloodbath,” and expressed concern that the Belgian peacekeepers could become “passive 
witnesses to genocide in Rwanda.”23
But most U.S. government diplomatic reporting and intelligence analysis on Rwanda lacked 
this sense of urgency. Although a few analysts issued warnings about the potential for mass 
atrocities, virtually none of the Central Africa experts in the U.S. government anticipated the scope 
of the impending violence. For example, David Rawson, who became U.S. ambassador to Rwanda 
in January 1994, had grown up in Burundi as the son of a missionary and was one of the only 
speakers of Kinyarwanda in the U.S. government. Though Rawson “expected internecine killing, 
he did not anticipate the scale at which it occurred. ‘Nothing in Rwandan culture or history could 
have led a person to that forecast,’ he says. ‘Most of us thought that if a war broke out, it would be 
quick, that these poor people didn’t have the resources, the means, to fight a sophisticated war. I 
couldn’t have known that they would do each other in with the most economic means.’”24 George 
Moose, then serving as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, echoes this view: “We were 
psychologically and imaginatively too limited.”25
For officials at the highest echelons of the U.S. government, the degree of awareness of the 
situation in Rwanda was far lower. Madeleine Albright, who was the U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations, recalls:
There had been killings in Somalia, Bosnia; just constant attention to a lot of other issues, 
unfortunately. We did know obviously that there were struggles both in Rwanda and Burundi. 
There was hope that the Arusha accords would actually have resolved some of the long-term 
fighting between the Hutus and Tutsis, so I think it was not high on the agenda…. It didn’t 
show up very often in intelligence summaries. There were not very frequent reports about it.26
According to Anthony Lake, President Clinton’s National Security Adviser from 1993 to 1997, 
“[T]here was very little attention to what the problem was and how to fix it politically . . . at least 
at my level.” Several days after the genocide erupted on 6 April 1994, Lake attended a meeting at 
the Pentagon to plan the evacuation of American civilians from Rwanda. At the end of the meeting, 
he says, “I asked some of the people from the Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘So what’s going on? 
Who’s killing who? I haven’t seen much about this.’ Maybe I’d seen something, but hadn’t certainly 
focused on it. And they couldn’t tell me.”27 Likewise, Lieutenant General Wesley Clark, who was 
then serving as Director of Strategic Plans and Policy for the Department of Defense, “frantically 
telephoned around the Pentagon for insight into the ethnic dimensions of events in Rwanda” in 
early April. Clark remembers staff officers asking: “Is it Hutu and Tutsi or Tutu and Hutsi?”28 
To evaluate the quality of U.S. intelligence analysis and diplomatic reporting on Rwanda 
during the months leading up to the genocide, one must first make clear one’s premises about the 
nature and purpose of conflict analysis and early warning. Many laypeople conceive of intelligence 
analysis as a kind of crystal ball whose value depends on how accurately it predicts future events. 
For example, several publications on the Rwanda genocide have asserted that, in early 1994, a CIA 
analyst predicted that as many as 500,000 people might die there in genocidal violence.29 They 
present this claim as proof that the U.S. government knew that genocide was imminent in Rwanda, 
and that it should have taken more robust preventive action. 
23 Belgian Foreign Ministry, Telex #64, From MINAFET to DELBELONU, 25 February 1994. Available from:  
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1015806-19940225-gob-bsrr-translation.html#document/p1/a144308 
(accessed 14 January 2016).
24 Quoted in Power A Problem From Hell, 347-48.
25 Ibid, 348.
26 Albright, Madeleine. Interview for PBS Frontline documentary, “Ghosts of Rwanda,” 25 February 2004. Available from: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/albright.html (accessed 14 January 2016).
27 Lake, Anthony.Interview for PBS Frontline documentary, “Ghosts of Rwanda,” 13 December 2003. Available from: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/lake.html (accessed 14 January 2016).
28 Power, A Problem From Hell, 330.
29 Ibid, 338; OAU, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, chap. 9, p. 5; Des Forges, xxx.
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But this line of argumentation presents two difficulties. First, the intelligence report that 
allegedly predicted half a million deaths may well be apocryphal. Three senior U.S. government 
analysts—two from the CIA and one from the State Department—who have searched the CIA’s 
classified records have been unable to locate any such document. Nor does such a document appear 
in the collection of nearly 4,500 declassified U.S. and Canadian diplomatic cables and intelligence 
reports from between 1990 and 1994 concerning Rwanda that have been obtained by the National 
Security Archive, an independent institute at the George Washington University,30 or in a more 
recent tranche of declassified documents published by the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in 
2014.31
The second, more fundamental difficulty with the claim that the CIA predicted the Rwandan 
genocide lies in the very assumption that intelligence analysis should have the capacity to accurately 
predict future events. Nassim Taleb, a statistician who studies business risks, points out that there 
are inherent limitations to humans’ capacity to anticipate future catastrophic events. Taleb uses 
the term “Black Swan” to describe a “random event satisfying the following three properties: large 
impact, incomputable probabilities, and surprise effect.” Because a Black Swan represents a sudden 
and massive deviation from a normative state “with nothing in the past history of the process . . . 
indicating such possibility,” it cannot be reliably predicted. Moreover:
By some vicious dialectic, it is the surprise element that either causes the Black Swan or at 
least exacerbates its consequences. If there were anything [in past experience] convincing 
about the need for protection, then agents would have taken preventive or protective actions. 
These would have either stopped it in its tracks or limited its impact.32
One of the most sophisticated Central Africa analysts in the U.S. government in 1994 worked 
in the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. An expert on the political dynamics 
of Rwanda and Burundi, he had a Ph.D. in Conflict Resolution had done extensive research on 
peace processes in Africa. In his view, the Rwandan genocide meets Taleb’s criteria for the Black 
Swan: “I don’t think normal analysis can account for a ‘perfect storm.’ I still think that if you put 
good analysts in a room and gave them the pre-94 data they would not come up with genocide on 
that scale.”33
Indeed, recent historical research by historians including André Guichaoua, as well as findings 
by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), suggests that the genocide may not 
have been fully planned in advance. Rather, the violence escalated rapidly in April 1994 as a result 
of evolving circumstances on the ground and decisions made by key actors in the conflict.34
Although it may have been impossible before April 1994 to predict the magnitude of the 
impending violence in Rwanda, ample evidence existed regarding the ominous nature of the 
conflict. One curious aspect of international reporting on Rwandan politics during this period 
is that, in several cases, observers with relatively little personal knowledge of Central Africa 
recognized the threat of genocide more clearly than seasoned Africa hands in the U.S. government, 
the United Nations, and other organizations. In 1993, both the International Commission of Inquiry 
on Violations of Human Rights in Rwanda and B. W. Ndiaye, the UN Special Rapporteur, described 
the conflict as a potential genocide—though neither predicted the magnitude of the killing. In 
30 Rwanda Genocide Collection (compiled 1998-2003), National Security Archive, Washington, DC.
31 U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Rwanda: Turning Points,” 2014. Available from: http://www.ushmm.org/confront-
genocide/cases/rwanda/turning-points (accessed 14 January 2016).
32 Taleb, Nassim N. “Rare Events: Why Don’t We Understand Them?” (unpublished ms.), Highland Forum 23, Las  
Vegas, November 2003, 5-6. Available from: http://highlands.vmhost.psu.edu/_reading/docs/blackswan.pdf (accessed  
14 January 2016).
33 U.S. State Department Rwanda-Burundi analyst, interview with the author, March 8, 2007. In The U.S. State 
Department’s Bureau of African Affairs declined the author’s request to quote this analyst by name, so he is referred to in 
subsequent references simply as a U.S. State Department Rwanda analyst.
34 See for example Guichaoua, André. 2005. Rwanda 1994: Les politiques du genocide à Butare. Paris: Editions Karthala; 
Guichaoua, André, editor. 1995, Les crises politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993-1994). Lille: Université de Lille 1, 
Diffusion Karthala.
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January 1994, the newly arrived UN force commander in Rwanda, Gen. Dallaire, also warned of 
the potential for catastrophic violence against Rwandan Tutsis.
U.S. diplomats and analysts witnessed the same danger signs as these other observers but 
frequently discounted their significance. Ambassador Joyce Leader, who was Deputy Chief of 
Mission in Embassy Kigali from 1991 to 1994, recalls a series of worrisome events of late 1992 and 
early 1993:
• The infamous speech of 22 November 1992 by Leon Mugesera, an MRND official in the 
Northwestern Gisenyi Prefecture (Pres. Habyarimana’s home district), denouncing the 
opposition parties as traitors, condoning summary justice against them, and declaring that 
the “Tutsi should return to Ethiopia from whence they came … via the Nyaborongo River” 
(implying that they should be murdered and their bodies thrown into the river). According 
to Amb. Leader, Mugesera’s message “spread by word of mouth like wildfire throughout 
the country,” and that subsequently, Tutsi employees of the American embassy “were 
falling asleep at their desks, unable to do their work,” because the men were standing 
guard at night to protect their families from attack.
• A speech by a local official in Gisenyi Prefecture in late December 1992 warning of 
imminent RPF attacks and advising listeners to “clear the brush” in the forest—i.e. kill 
Tutsi villagers—“so the RPF would have nowhere to hide.”
• The massacres of at least 300 Tutsi in Gisenyi Prefecture in December 1992 and January 
1993, which, “though portrayed as spontaneous, … stopped abruptly during a two to 
three week period in January when an International Commission on Human Rights was 
in Rwanda.”
• “Daily reports … about deaths and destruction across northern Rwanda.”35
Yet the Embassy staff made little systematic effort to investigate these incidents. Joyce Leader 
recalls: “[W]e knew about the formation and the training of the militia, but we didn’t do anything 
about it, except to talk to people and say that this is unconscionable—you can’t do this.”36 Indeed, 
diplomatic cables from Embassy Kigali sometimes minimized the significance of the violence in 
Rwanda. For example, on 16 December 1992, the State Department’s Bureau of Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs transmitted a draft of the 1992 Country Report on Human Rights Practices 
for Rwanda to Embassy Kigali. The report charged: “In 1992 there were significant human rights 
abuses, many related to the conflict with the RPF,” and that: “Credible reports allege that local 
officials were involved in widespread ethnic violence in March in which 300 died and 15,000 were 
displaced.”37 A week later, Embassy Kigali cabled back to protest these allegations:
We contest the claim of “significant human rights abuses.” War, ethnic violence, political 
violence, terrorism and unchecked assaults are abominations and cause immense 
human suffering. Can they, however, be classified as human rights abuses when their 
links to government actions or agents are tenuous, unproven and, indeed, seem to be 
perpetrated by all sides and not necessarily orchestrated or organized? In Rwanda, all 
sides are suspect but conclusive evidence is either lacking or ambiguous. We propose: 
 
In 1992 there were human rights abuses in Rwanda, many related to the conflict with the 
RPF.38
35 Leader, Joyce E. Rwanda’s Struggle for Democracy and Peace, 22-23.
36 Leader, Amb. Joyce E. Interview with the author, November 2004.
37 U.S. State Department, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, “Rwanda: Initial Edit of 1992 Country 
Report on Human Rights Practices,” 16 December 1992, 3, Rwanda Genocide Collection (compiled 1998-2003), National 
Security Archive, Washington, DC.
38 Embassy Kigali to Secretary of State Washington, “Comments on Initial Edit of 1992 Human Rights Report: Rwanda,” 23 
December 1993, 3, Rwanda Genocide Collection (compiled 1998-2003), National Security Archive, Washington, DC.
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As for the reports published by the International Commission of Inquiry in March 1993 and 
by the UN Special Rapporteur that August, Embassy Kigali noted duly their assertions, but did 
not share their sense of alarm. Indeed, the first draft of the Embassy’s 1993 Human Rights Country 
Report for Rwanda, composed that October, asserted: “The peace process that culminated in the 
August 4 peace accord led to the virtual elimination of the human rights abuses that plagued the 
country during the first quarter of 1993.”39 Commenting on a subsequent draft of the Human Rights 
Report two months later, Embassy Kigali declared of the International Commission of Inquiry:
The group’s findings were welcomed by the human rights groups in Rwanda that believe 
the president and his party are behind all abuses; they documented long-held suspicions. 
However, the human rights groups that defend Hutus criticized the Commission’s work. 
The Commission’s methodology had several weaknesses.40
The Embassy did not elaborate on the nature of the weaknesses it perceived in the Commission’s 
report.
During the eighteen months before the genocide, analysts at both the State Department and 
the Defense Intelligence Agency issued occasional warnings of the potential for mass atrocities in 
Rwanda. Already in September 1992, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
(INR) issued a classified report with the chillingly prescient subtitle “The Hutu Right and the 
Genocide Card.” This report pointed out that, historically, when exiled Tutsi had launched cross-
border attacks aimed at toppling the Hutu-dominated government, “The Kigali regime—or 
certainly key elements within it—reacted by killing Tutsis living inside Rwanda.”41 In February 
1993, following the Gisenyi massacres and the subsequent resumption of the RPF offensive in 
Northern Rwanda, the DIA Weekly Warning Forecast Summary declared: “Renewed warfare 
could lead to the RPF and government forces participating in ‘ethnic cleansing’ of their opponents 
further exacerbating the situation.”42 
Despite having invoked the term genocide, the author of the State Department report says that 
he did not imagine the possibility of the full-scale destruction of Rwanda’s Tutsi population:
I was certainly aware of the possibility of something like that happening, of genocidal type 
killing going on. The thing that I didn’t get was the scale of this thing. I think I explicitly 
said, “Oh you could have like twenty thousand people killed, as occurred in the early sixties, 
twenty thousand people.” It’s sort of like, magnify that by ten times or twenty times, or forty 
times! That took a leap of imagination I just didn’t have.43
But the majority of U.S. intelligence reporting and diplomatic cables on Rwanda before 
April 1994 failed to differentiate between the threat of war and genocide. Typical of such 
reports was the CIA’s classified Africa Review of 14 January 1994, which included an item on 
Rwanda under the heading: “Sub-Saharan Africa: Democratization Chronology.” Circulated 
three days after Gen. Dallaire’s alarming fax to UN headquarters about the arms caches in Kigali, 
this report included no mention of the Dallaire fax (which none of our interviewees reports ever 
having seen before the genocide), but two brief paragraphs about the renewed mandate of the 
UN peacekeeping mission to Rwanda and one paragraph on delays in the implementation of the 
Arusha Accords:
39 Embassy Kigali, “1993 Human Rights Report: Rwanda,” Kigali 03613, 4 October 1993, 3, Rwanda Genocide Collection 
(compiled 1998-2003), National Security Archive, Washington, DC.
40 Embassy Kigali, “Rwanda: Comments on Initial Edit of 1993 Report on Human Rights Practices,” Kigali 04523, 22 
December 1993, Rwanda Genocide Collection (compiled 1998-2003), National Security Archive, Washington, DC.
41 U.S. State Department Rwanda analyst, interview with the author, November 2004.
42 DIA Weekly Warning Forecast Summary, 10 Feb. 1993, 2, Rwanda Genocide Collection (compiled 1998-2003), National 
Security Archive, Washington, DC.
43 U.S. State Department Rwanda analyst, interview with the author, November 2004.
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Political bickering … indefinitely postpones the swearing in of a broad-based transitional 
cabinet and national assembly as called for by the August 1993 settlement agreement that 
ended 34 months of fighting between the ethnic Hutu-majority based regime and opposing 
Tutsi rebels. Any prolonged impasse risks a breakdown of the country’s cease-fire.44
Apart from the reference to political bickering, which indicates incuriosity about the pre-genocidal 
conditions in Rwanda, this report was striking for the implicit plot line that it put forth. The report 
suggested that the democratization process in Rwanda had the potential to move either forwards 
or backwards—but it did not entertain the possibility that political events might veer off in an 
entirely different and more sinister direction.
The most explicit warning of the possibility of imminent violence came in a CIA report 
included in the highly classified National Intelligence Daily of 19 March 1994, less than three weeks 
before the genocide began. But this paragraph-long warning also focused on the risk of renewed 
civil war rather than genocide. Under the heading “Rwanda: Threat of Violence Increasing,” the 
paragraph read:
Security is deteriorating in Kigali and in the demilitarized zone between Hutu-dominated 
government troops and Tutsi rebel forces. Rumors of imminent warfare are sweeping the 
capital, international relief workers report both sides are fortifying defensive positions in 
the demilitarized zone, and a nearby American-owned tea factory may close temporarily, 
according to the US Embassy. Unless President Habyarimana quickly begins a good-
faith effort to form the multiethnic government he agreed to, the rebels probably will  
resume fighting.45
Nor did the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research warn of mass atrocities 
against civilians—though, during the months leading up to the genocide, it issued increasingly 
urgent warnings of the risk of a renewed war between the Rwandan government and the Tutsi 
expatriate army. In December 1993, two months after the assassination of Burundi’s first Hutu 
president, Melchior Ndadaye, INR distributed another classified assessment entitled “Burundi: 
The Sum of All Fears.” This assessment reported that, since October, “Tens of thousands—no 
one knows exactly how many; estimates range from 30,000 to 150,000—have been killed [and] … 
700,000 persons … have fled Burundi.” Yet the concluding section of this report, entitled “Rwandan 
spillover,” made no reference to the possibility that Rwanda might soon experience violence far 
exceeding the scope of the bloodshed in Burundi. It declared of Rwanda:
Leaders of the key parties—perhaps reassured by the presence of 800 Belgian and Bangladeshi 
peacekeepers in the capital, and exhausted from a three-year war that neither the RPF 
nor government could win—still seem committed to power-sharing. But fear, instability, 
and disorganization exacerbated by events in Burundi may further delay or derail the 
establishment of a transition government originally slated to take power in September.46
According to the author of this INR report, U.S. diplomats “were paying so much attention to the 
peace process, and trying to keep it on the rails, trying to get that transitional government going 
that [the Embassy] didn’t really appreciate the possibility of things going completely south.”47
44 CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “Africa Review,” 14 January 1994, 21, Rwanda Genocide Collection (compiled 1998-
2003), National Security Archive, Washington, DC.
45 National Intelligence Daily, 19 March 1994, 13, Rwanda Genocide Collection (compiled 1998-2003), National Security 
Archive, Washington, DC. (Italics in original.)
46 Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, “Burundi: The Sum of All Fears,” SC#12802-93, 
December 16, 1993, Rwanda Genocide Collection (compiled 1998-2003), National Security Archive, Washington, DC, 14-
15. Available from: http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB466/ (accessed 14 January 2016).
47 U.S. State Department Rwanda analyst, interview with the author, November 2004.
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The Perils of Powersharing: U.S. Diplomatic Strategy, 1990-1994
Peace processes are great. Peace processes sometimes bring peace, and that’s wonderful. But 
peace processes, especially at the U.N. and especially within the State Department, can also 
be a way of saying we’re doing something even when you had, at a minimum, a nagging 
voice telling you that maybe this ain’t working and you have harder decisions to make.  
 —Anthony Lake, U.S. National Security Advisor, 1993-199748
“We were naïve policy optimists, I suppose,” says Ambassador David Rawson of the attitude 
of the U.S. diplomatic corps toward Rwanda during the months leading up to the genocide:
The fact that negotiations can’t work is almost not one of the options open to people who 
care about peace. We were looking for the hopeful signs, not the dark signs…. One of the 
things I learned and should have already known is that once you launch a process, it takes 
on its own momentum. I had said, “Let’s try this, and then if it doesn’t work, we can back 
away.” But bureaucracies don’t allow that. Once the Washington side buys into a process, it 
gets pursued, almost blindly.49
The Rwanda analyst in the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research echoes Rawson’s 
view:
I would say the Arusha Agreement, to which we were so committed, was deeply flawed 
in ways we were probably not willing to admit, because… it was all we had, so we had 
to make it work…. We had gone down this path to such an extent that… to go back to the 
international community that had helped forge the peace accord and say, “Well, we better 
start over again,” was just not in the cards.50
This commitment to the Arusha process at any price reflected the broader priorities of U.S. 
foreign policy on Africa in the aftermath of the Cold War. Following the Soviet Union’s collapse 
in the early 1990s, U.S. policymakers had adopted “conflict resolution and democratization” as 
the watchwords of their diplomacy toward Sub-Saharan Africa. Operating under the premise that 
democratic societies were intrinsically stable and peaceful, policymakers devised a one-size-fits-all 
approach to ending violent conflict: convening peace negotiations to produce democratic power-
sharing agreements, whose implementation should ipso facto result in peace. 
This new foreign policy paradigm was summarized by National Security Directive (NSD) 75 
on “American Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s,” which President George H. W. 
Bush approved in December 1992, and which remained in force during the first years of the Clinton 
administration. The policy prescriptions set forth in NSD 75 reflected widely shared assumptions 
of the U.S. foreign policy establishment during the early 1990s: “Post-colonial, authoritarian 
regimes in Africa have been dismal failures. As they disappear, we have a historical opportunity 
to show Africans how stability and development can be achieved through participatory political 
life and responsible government.” By propagating “democratic values,” the “rule of law,” and 
“free and fair elections,” U.S.-sponsored programs could “help make democratic experiments in 
Africa permanent realities” and thus promote the primary U.S. objectives of “conflict resolution 
and political stability” in Sub-Saharan Africa.51
Despite the lofty rhetoric, the Arusha Accords were a profoundly flawed foundation for 
stable peace in Rwanda. Astri Suhrke and Bruce Jones describe the Arusha Accords as a “victor’s 
agreement”—or, in the words of Belgian scholar Filip Reyntjens at the time of the signing—“a 
48 Lake, Anthony. Frontline interview, 13 December 2003.
49 Rawson, Amb. David. quoted in Power, A Problem from Hell, 347.
50 U.S. State Department Rwanda analyst, interview with the author, November 2004.
51 Bush, President George H. W. National Security Directive 75, “American Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa in the 
1990s”, 2. Available from: https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/nsd/nsd75.pdf (accessed 14 January 2016).
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veritable coup d’état for the RPF and the internal opposition.”52 The RPF had routed the Rwandan 
government’s military forces in its February 1993 offensive, and France’s military support for the 
Habyarimana regime had played a critical role in halting the RPF’s initial advance toward Kigali. 
Moreover, the RPF fielded a highly focused and disciplined team of negotiators to the Arusha 
negotiations of 1992-1993, whereas the government’s negotiating team was fractured between 
Habyarimana’s MRND party and three opposition parties. Foreign Minister Boniface Ngulinzira, 
a member of the opposition MDR, headed the government’s negotiating team. On the RPF’s 
insistence, the Hutu extremist Coalition for Defense of the Republic (CDR) was excluded from the 
negotiating table—but CDR observers attended the Arusha talks and worked to undermine any 
potential agreement.53 
Another factor weakening the position of the Rwandan government vis-à-vis the RPF 
reflected a structural feature of the Arusha negotiations. As INR had emphasized in a classified 
“African Trends” report issued on 18 September 1992 (nearly a year before the signing of the 
Arusha Accords):
Habyarimana’s side has been pushed harder and more successfully to compromise. The 
government is vulnerable to military pressure from the RPF and to political and economic 
pressure from major western donors. The RPF leadership by contrast enjoys sanctuary in 
Uganda and is not so heavily pressed by Kigali, outsiders, or the costs of a war which is 
fought on Rwandan soil. It is likely, therefore, that the RPF will maintain a more intransigent 
negotiating position. This would perpetuate the current instability and stir passions that 
could lead to the sort of anti-Tutsi genocide that gripped Rwanda and neighboring Burundi 
in the past.54
This report warned of “the possibility of a genocidal civil war” if the ongoing talks in Arusha were 
to fail:
Whether the parties reach agreement depends partly on how much power President 
Habyarimana is willing to cede to the RPF and domestic opposition parties. But to be 
accepted by Kigali (and viewed as legitimate by the Rwandan people), a true settlement also 
depends on the RPF’s willingness to accept a powersharing formula more in accordance 
with the Tutsis’ 10-15 percent of the population than with the 50-50 share the RPF has been 
demanding.
As a result of these imbalances at the Arusha talks, the final peace agreement was highly 
unfavorable to Habyarimana’s MRND party, which was granted only five of twenty-one cabinet 
positions in the prospective 22-month Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG). The 
agreement was even less appealing to the extremist CDR, which was excluded from the government 
altogether. Adding insult to injury, the RPF was given the right to provide 40 percent of the soldiers 
in the new Rwandan army, and 50 percent of the officer corps, far above the Tutsis’ proportion of 
the country’s population.55
Suhrke and Jones observe: “While resembling a victor’s agreement, the accords left the losing 
side with access to the state apparatus in an interim period, and hence the means for obstructing the 
52 Suhrke and Jones, “Preventive Diplomacy in Rwanda,” 244, 246.
53 Stettenheim, Joel. 2000. “The Arusha Accords and the Failure of International Intervention in Rwanda,” in Words 
over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict, Greenberg, Melanie C. John H. Barton, and Margaret E. 
McGuinness, editors. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 224-26.
54 U.S. Department of State, cable State 310659, “INR/AA’s African Trends – 9/18/92 (No. 19),” September 23, 1992, in 
International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide: Rwanda 1990-1993, Briefing Book, Vol. 1, compiled and produced by the 
National Security Archive, at George Washington University, June 2014, 1-69. Available from: http://www.ushmm.org/m/
pdfs/20150325-rwanda-briefing-one.pdf (accessed 14 January 2016).
55 On the proportion of Tutsi in the Rwandan population, see Straus, The Order of Genocide¸ 19.
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implementation of a political order that was decidedly unfavorable to its interests.”56 Both during 
the negotiations and in the implementation phase, Habyarimana made no secret of his distaste 
for the accords. He refused to sign any of the preliminary agreements before the final ceremony 
in Arusha in August 1993, and he repeatedly disavowed proposals that had been accepted by the 
government’s own negotiating team.57 In November 1992, Habyarimana announced in a public 
speech that the agreement on political power-sharing was “nothing but a scrap of paper…that the 
government is not obliged to respect.”58 Several months later, at the 1993 annual conference of the 
MRND, he pledged to resist any sharing of power with the RPF.59
Beyond these general concerns about the political marginalization of the MRND and the 
CDR’s exclusion from power, the Arusha Accords also sparked fears among Rwandan Hutus about 
their economic well-being and even their physical survival. UN Special Rapporteur B. W. Ndiaye 
pointed to one of these concerns in his report of August 1993:
Many of the people to whom the Special Rapporteur spoke pointed out that the return of 
the 400,000 to 500,000 refugees from abroad would cause a number of problems. Firstly, 
as has been mentioned, Rwanda is the most densely populated country in Africa and 
there has long since been no land to spare. In addition to this, certain Hutu businessmen 
are afraid that the Tutsi who have made their fortune in the countries receiving them 
are coming back to resume control of the Rwandese economy, thereby reasserting their  
domination.60
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen, who oversaw U.S. policy at 
the outset of the Arusha talks in 1992, had identified the refugee problem as a key obstacle to a 
peace settlement, and advocated addressing it as a primary issue for negotiation.61 But while the 
final agreement of 1993 guaranteed the right of return for Tutsi refugees, it provided no formal 
safeguards for the rights of those already residing in Rwanda, apart from the stipulation that 
“refugees who left the country more than 10 years ago should not reclaim their properties, which 
might have been occupied by other people.”62 
Another possible cause for concern for the Hutu elites was the loss of the safety net provided 
by the French military forces in Rwanda, which had intervened three times to protect the regime 
from the RPF. In January 1993, French Ambassador Georges Martre, who had long been a staunch 
advocate for the Habyarimana regime, ended his tour of duty in Kigali.63 The Arusha Accords 
mandated that all French military forces leave Rwanda as a precondition for the power-sharing 
agreement. Their departure in December 1993 deprived Rwandan Hutus of this implicit security 
guarantee, leaving in place only a weak UN contingent that had neither the mandate nor the 
capacity for a robust peace enforcement mission.
By far the most damaging blow to the confidence of Rwanda’s Hutu leaders was the mass killing 
that erupted in neighboring Burundi in October 1993, following the assassination of the newly 
elected Hutu president of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye. In the words of the State Department’s 
Rwanda analyst:
56 Suhrke and Jones, “Preventive Diplomacy in Rwanda,” 244.
57 See for example U.S. Department of State, cable State 310659, “INR/AA’s African Trends – 9/18/92 (No. 19),” 23 
September 1992, 1-74. 
58 Stettenheim, “The Arusha Accords,” 215; Leader, Rwanda’s Struggle for Democracy and Peace, 19.
59Keane, Season of Blood, 92.
60 United Nations Economic and Social Council, “Report by Mr. B. W. Ndiaye, Special Rapporteur,” 8.
61 Stettenheim, “The Arusha Accords,” 223.
62 See Arusha Accords, “Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese 
Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons,” Article 4, 9 June 
1993. Available from: http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/rwan1.pdf (accessed 14 January 2016).
63 U.S. Department of State, cable Kigali 00068, “Kigali Awaits Protocol,” 8 January 1993, Rwanda Genocide Collection 
(compiled 1998-2003), National Security Archive, Washington, DC.
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I think one of the reasons the Rwandan Hutus signed onto Arusha in August was because 
they felt like they could relax a little bit, because the Tutsis had peacefully surrendered 
power in [Burundi in] June/July. So the Burundi transition may have contributed to a slight 
mellowing on the Hutu side. It seemed to be, “okay, this isn’t so bad, maybe things are 
changing, so maybe we can handle this power sharing government.” But then the army 
comes in and assassinates the president and plunges the country into this violent spiral. 
Rwandans look at that and just think, “Holy Christ, look what’s going on down there?”… 
[M]oderates were turned into hard-liners, and hardliners were turned into génocidaires, and 
it was… the only good Tutsi is a dead Tutsi. I don’t know if Arusha would have worked 
under any circumstances, but it became much, much, much more difficult after Burundi 
went down.64
Despite all of these ominous signs, U.S. diplomats continued to view the full and timely 
implementation of the Arusha Accords as the only viable path to sustainable peace in Rwanda. 
Joyce Leader, who was the Deputy Chief of Mission at Embassy Kigali, writes that she and other 
diplomats “assumed, mistakenly as it turned out, that the parties had agreed to … implement 
and abide by the agreements reached” and “treat the other side as a legitimate partner.” Western 
diplomatic interventions reinforced the conflict cycle: “The more the violence escalated, the harder 
we diplomats pushed for implementation of the Arusha Accord.”65
During the months leading up to the genocide, only one “Plan B” for Rwanda was seriously 
discussed by senior U.S. and UN policymakers: namely, “pulling the plug” on UNAMIR and 
withdrawing the peacekeeping force if the Rwandans failed to establish the transitional government 
in a timely manner.66 Ambassador Donald Steinberg, who was then serving as White House deputy 
press secretary, points out the fallacy behind this threat. Steinberg observes that telling the parties to 
the conflict “that if they were being intransigent, we could remove the international peacekeepers” 
was “the equivalent of saying if there is a babysitter and the kids are misbehaving, the alternative 
is to have the babysitter leave, and then they burn down the house.”67
Policy Implications for Genocide Prevention
In a 2006 interview, former President Bill Clinton recalled his own response toward the Rwanda 
genocide as it was unfolding: “We never even had a staff meeting on it. But I don’t blame anybody 
that works for me. That was my fault. I should have been alert and alive to it.”68 In seeking to 
account for the passivity of senior U.S. officials toward the Rwanda genocide, most commentators 
have pointed to the lack of “political will” for a more robust response. Samantha Power has argued:
It is in the realm of domestic politics that the battle to stop genocide is lost. American political 
leaders interpret society-wide silence as an indicator of public indifference. They reason that 
they will incur no costs if the United States remains uninvolved but will face steep risks if 
they engage. Potential sources of influence—lawmakers on Capitol Hill, editorial boards, 
64 State Department Rwanda analyst, interview with the author, November 2004.
65 Leader, Joyce E. “The Case of Rwanda,” unpublished ms., September 2005, 3, 5.
66 See for example U.S. Department of State, cable USUN 01187, “Discussions on Rwanda Mandate and New SRSG to 
Zaire”, 23 March 1994, Rwanda Genocide Collection (compiled 1998-2003), National Security Archive, Washington, DC. 
Available from: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB472/pdf/us01187.pdf (accessed 14 January 2016). Prudence 
Bushnell recalls: “I met with both sides in mid-March [1994], about two weeks before the plane was shot down. And I met 
with Kagame and company, as well as Habyarimana, and Generals. I told them…, ‘You have been futzing around on this 
for a long time, so if you don’t put the interim government that you promised to put in place soon, the Security Council 
may vote to remove the peacekeepers, and if they do, I am really concerned about what may happen.’ I think they would 
have liked nothing better than to have them removed, but I don’t know that Habyarimana was in that position. I would 
understand completely that the extremists would want the peacekeepers out.” Interview with the author, September  
2006.
67 Steinberg, Amb. Donald. Interview with the author, 30 October 2006. Steinberg is referring here to his own subsequent 
negotiating experiences as Ambassador to Angola from 1995 to 1998.
68 Remnick, David. “The Wanderer,” The New Yorker, 18 September 2006.
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non-governmental groups, and ordinary constituents—do not generate political pressure 
sufficient to change the calculus of America’s leaders.69
Although Power makes a persuasive case, it is important to recognize that genocide cannot 
be prevented merely by building the political will to do so. In any genocidal situation, popular 
demands by the American public for humanitarian intervention are likely to arise—if at all—only 
after mass atrocities have begun, by which time tens or hundreds of thousands of people may 
already have been killed. And by this stage of the crisis, many low-cost, non-military options 
for intervention may have evaporated, forcing policymakers to resort to risky and costly peace 
enforcement missions in order to suppress genocidal violence. From this perspective, it appears 
that the most important question is not how to generate the political will to respond to genocide 
when it occurs, but rather how to create the diplomatic capacity to prevent genocide before it begins.
Information Collection and Analysis
Three principal deficiencies in information collection and analysis hampered U.S. officials’ 
efforts to understand the emerging crisis in Rwanda: (1) the lack of early warning mechanisms 
for conveying relevant information to high-level U.S. policymakers; (2) inadequate information 
gathering concerning the conflict; and (3) the distorted framing of the conflict as a civil war rather 
than as a potential genocide.
Lack of early warning mechanisms. Events in Central Africa rarely attracted the attention of 
U.S. policymakers above the level of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Even within the 
State Department’s Africa Bureau, the attention of senior officials was split in numerous directions. 
Amb. Prudence Bushnell, who was serving as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs, recalls: “I was responsible …for promoting democracy in 48 countries, resolving 
conflict in all these countries. It included environment, HIV/AIDS—I mean what a perfectly 
ridiculous portfolio to have.”70 The State Department and intelligence agencies did not have any 
systematic mechanism for calling the attention of senior officials at the White House and National 
Security Council to emerging threats of genocide.
Inadequate information gathering. Embassy Kigali was a small overseas post with a staff 
of only four U.S. nationals including the ambassador. It had no political officer, CIA station, or 
military attaché, which meant that the ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission were the primary 
“eyes and ears” for the mission. Embassy staff cultivated only limited local contacts apart from 
Rwandan government officials, diplomats from other embassies in Kigali, and foreign nationals 
working for the U.S. mission. They did not consistently investigate incidents of violence or rumors 
of treaty violations. Nor did they systematically track or report on “hate radio” broadcasts or 
speeches by prominent political figures inciting intercommunal violence. Joyce Leader recalls: “I 
think the formation of the militia was something we knew about, but we just never got out and 
tried to track it down. We went on what we gathered from other people without any firsthand 
information. When we would confront people in positions of authority, which we did, they would 
of course deny that any such militarization was going on.”71
Both in Kigali and in Washington, diplomats and intelligence analysts either lacked access to 
or gave insufficient credence to explicit warnings of potential mass violence. For example, none of 
our interviewees reported having seen Gen. Dallaire’s fax to UN headquarters of 11 January 1994, 
which warned of the existence of arms caches in Kigali and of Hutu extremists’ plans to exterminate 
the Tutsi. As for the warnings of impending violence issued by Rwandan and international human 
rights organizations, U.S. diplomats tended to discount these reports, at least partially, as lacking 
in objectivity and methodological rigor.
Distorted framing of the conflict. The premise that the establishment of democratic institutions 
was the sole viable path to sustainable peace in Sub-Saharan Africa exerted a powerful influence 
69 Power, A Problem from Hell, xviii.
70 Bushnell, Amb. Prudence. Interview with the author, September 2006.
71 Leader, Amb. Joyce E. Interview for PBS Frontline documentary, “Ghosts of Rwanda,” 30 September 2003. Available 
from: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/leader.html (accessed 14 January 2016).
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over U.S. diplomats’ and intelligence analysts’ reporting on Rwanda. In Joyce Leader’s words, “The 
embassy was of the view that a lot of the violence that was going on in the country [was] random 
violence. We were of the view that this could be brought under control, if the peace process could 
be carried [out], concluded, and then implemented.”72 Perhaps these episodes of violence appeared 
“random” because they did not fit observers’ expectations for an emerging democracy. Viewed 
as warning signs of a potential genocide, these same acts of violence might not have appeared 
random at all.
In an incisive analysis of the UN response to the Rwandan genocide, Michael Barnett observes: 
“Before policymakers can act, they must come to create a definition and understanding of the 
situation, and that understanding is mediated by how the institution is organized to think.”73 This 
paper has shown that U.S. foreign policy institutions were not organized to think systematically 
about the threat of genocide in Rwanda during the early 1990s, and that this deficiency inhibited 
diplomats’ capacity to take effective preventive action. Despite urgent warnings of impending 
communal violence, U.S. diplomats and intelligence analysts focused principally on the risk of a 
return to conflict in Rwanda, not on the threat of genocide. Before April 1994, most U.S. intelligence 
analysts’ worst-case scenarios for Rwanda envisioned a potential death toll of tens of thousands, 
rather than a million. This faulty conflict analysis shaped U.S. policy deliberations, which, in 
syllogistic fashion, posited “democratization and conflict resolution” as the sole viable path to 
peace in Rwanda. U.S. policymakers discounted the possibility that the Arusha Accords might 
aggravate rather than resolve communal tensions in Rwanda, and U.S. officials did not develop any 
contingency plans for alternative policy options in the event that the power-sharing arrangements 
mandated by the Accords were to collapse. 
To be fair, one must acknowledge that U.S. government and other international observers 
confronted an exceptionally difficult analytical task during the months leading up to the Rwandan 
genocide, as well as during the first few weeks after its eruption. In early 1994, there existed a genuine 
risk of renewed conflict in Rwanda. The downing of the presidential jet on April 6 unleashed three 
simultaneous catastrophes in the country: a military coup, a civil war, and a genocide. U.S. analysts 
and policymakers struggled to make sense of these chaotic events.74 It is perhaps understandable 
that, both before and immediately after the outbreak of the genocide, outside observers focused their 
attention principally on the threat of war. And yet, the failure of American and other international 
leaders to recognize and respond to the prospect of mass violence against civilians in Rwanda gave 
an implicit green light to the génocidaires, and may have contributed to expanding the scope of the 
violence and accelerating its pace.
Policy Formation and Implementation
At the operational level, the U.S. government was served by a conscientious and capable—though 
frequently overwhelmed—group of diplomats who implemented its policy toward Rwanda during 
the three years leading up to the 1994 genocide. The central failure of U.S. diplomacy toward 
Rwanda during this period stemmed not from the deficiencies of individual diplomats, but rather 
from the overarching U.S. strategy for conflict resolution in Sub-Saharan Africa. This strategy, as 
outlined in National Security Directive 75 of 1992, emphasized the adoption and implementation of 
formal peace agreements and power-sharing arrangements, rather than an incremental approach 
toward achieving security and mutual trust among competing factions in order to prepare the 
ground for a stable democratic government. 
72 Ibid.
73 Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide, 60. 
74 For example, Pentagon talking points produced on April 11 warned: “Unless both sides can be convinced to return to the 
peace process, a massive (hundreds of thousands of deaths) bloodbath will ensue that would likely spill over into neighboring 
Burundi.” Despite this stark warning, the talking points stressed that the U.S. was not “willing to get involved… inside 
Rwanda or Burundi until peace is restored,” but that “we would want to restart our security assistance program once the peace 
process is back on track.” Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Africa, “Memorandum for Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy,” I-94/16533, April 11, 1994, in International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide: Rwanda 1990-1993, Briefing 
Book, Vol. 1, compiled and produced by the National Security Archive, at George Washington University, June 2014, 2-138 and 
2-139. Available from: http://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20150325-rwanda-briefing-one.pdf (accessed 14 January 2016)
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The U.S. government’s policy guidance toward Rwanda offered essentially only two 
alternatives: “Arusha or bust.” Given these constraints, the failure to successfully implement 
the Arusha Accords would have left U.S. diplomats entirely without options for productive 
engagement in this crisis. Thus, it is not surprising that the U.S. diplomatic corps invested all its 
energy into implementing the peace agreement, and discounted the potentially catastrophic effects 
of the failure to do so. 
Yet, perversely, the pressure to implement the Arusha Accords was one of the key factors 
exacerbating conflict and mutual distrust in Rwanda during the months leading up to the genocide. 
U.S. diplomats disregarded many ominous signs of the Accords’ destabilizing impact on Rwandan 
politics. For example:
• President Habyarimana’s obvious antipathy toward the power-sharing agreement 
mandated by the Arusha Accords and his reluctance to move toward the Accords’ 
implementation.
• The rage of the Hutu-extremist CDR over its exclusion from the transitional government, 
and CDR leaders’ public incitement of anti-Tutsi violence.
• Population pressures and the ongoing economic crisis, exacerbated by falling global 
commodity prices and the imposition of an economic austerity program by the International 
Monetary Fund. These factors heightened fears that the prospective return of hundreds of 
thousands of Tutsi refugees would threaten the livelihoods of Hutus—both farmers and 
merchants.
• Above all, the Burundi coup and massacres of civilians in October and November 1993, 
which terrified Rwandan Hutu leaders about the prospect of sharing political and military 
power with former Tutsi rebels.
In light of the escalating fears of Rwandan Hutus after the signing of the Arusha Accords, 
especially after the outbreak of mass violence in neighboring Burundi, the international diplomatic 
community might have been well-advised to suspend at least temporarily the implementation of 
the Arusha Accords, and to focus instead on interim steps toward reestablishing physical security 
and building trust among the rival factions in Rwanda. The report of August 1993 by B. W. Ndiaye, 
the UN Special Rapporteur, offered a useful starting point for such a policy. Among Ndiaye’s 
recommendations:
• “Mechanism for the protection of civilian populations against massacres. A mechanism 
for the protection of civilian populations against massacres should immediately be set up, 
in terms of both prevention … and monitoring and intervention in cases of violence…. 
To this end, international teams of human rights observers and a civilian police force 
might be established, particularly in high-risk areas; with the agreement of the Rwandese 
authorities, they would be placed under international supervision.”
• “National reconciliation campaign. A national reconciliation campaign should be 
organized in order to attempt to eliminate the negative effects in people’s minds of the 
odious disinformation advocating ethnic and political intolerance, hatred, and violence 
which has been disseminated in the past. This campaign should begin with a solemn, 
public commitment, in French and Kinyarwanda, by the Head of State, the Head of 
Government, the leaders of all the political parties and the religious authorities to adopt a 
policy of non-discrimination, national unity and respect for human rights…”
• “Media-related action…. The reform of the media should take place in accordance with 
the spirit of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles concerning the Contribution of the 
Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion 
of Human Rights and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War, 
proclaimed on 28 November 1978 at the twentieth session of the General Conference of 
UNESCO.”
• “Dismantling of all violent organizations. All violent organizations should be dismantled 
as a matter of urgency. Criminal organizations such as the ‘death squads,’ ‘Amasasu,’ 
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or ‘Network Zero,’ must be identified and dismantled, and their members prosecuted, 
whatever their rank.”
• “Combating impunity and compensating victims…. In describing the need to end the 
vicious circle of impunity by rendering justice to the victims and their families, some 
of the people with whom the Special Rapporteur spoke mentioned the need for ‘drastic 
surgery’ in order to bring about genuine national reconciliation and eliminate the spectre 
of a recurrence of the massacres…. History now seems to be repeating itself, and the errors 
of the past should be avoided.”75 
Bruce Jentleson has written: “Foreign policy is about making choices. The choice for preventive 
diplomacy is politically difficult, the political constraints are serious ones; but they are potentially 
malleable… The key, as it always has been and always will be, is executive leadership.”76 As the 
proposals in Ndiaye’s report vividly illustrate, U.S. diplomats were not inevitably locked into the 
policies that they pursued during the months leading up to the Rwandan genocide. They made 
choices to adopt one set of policies, aimed at “democratization and conflict resolution,” rather than 
another, that would have sought to build physical security and mutual trust as preconditions for 
stable democratic rule.77 The obstacles to adopting this alternative course of action were not the lack 
of imagination, nor the lack of knowledge, nor even primarily the lack of resources, because only 
modest resources would have been required in order to begin to implement several of Ndiaye’s 
proposals. Rather, the obstacles lay principally in the ways that U.S. foreign policy institutions 
were “organized to think.” In order to work effectively to prevent atrocities, diplomats and senior 
policymakers must learn to think anew about the nature and the urgency of this challenge.
Lessons Learned? The Path Forward
In the two decades since the Rwandan catastrophe, the U.S. government has adopted measures to 
better anticipate and respond to emerging threats of genocide and mass atrocities, most notably 
through President Obama’s establishment of the interagency Atrocity Prevention Board (APB) in 
2012. This new administrative machinery for atrocities prevention within the U.S. government 
has facilitated more robust and sustained attention to civil strife in countries of otherwise 
peripheral interest to senior U.S. policymakers, including Burma, Kenya, Burundi, the Central 
African Republic, and South Sudan.78
The creation of the APB, which convenes on a monthly basis to assess emerging threats of 
genocide and mass atrocities around the world, has helped remedy some of the institutional 
deficits that hampered U.S. analysis of the Rwandan crisis on the eve of the genocide. In particular: 
• The APB provides an institutional channel for communicating early warnings of potential 
mass atrocities to the highest levels of the U.S. executive branch.
• When warranted, the APB can provide a limited “surge capacity” for information gathering 
and analysis concerning emerging threats—though its resources for such activities remain 
restricted.
• The APB applies an analytical lens focused specifically on the atrocity prevention mandate, 
allowing it to complement the perspectives of analysts and diplomats who are focused 
75 United Nations Economic and Social Council, “Report by Mr. B. W. Ndiaye, Special Rapporteur,” 11 August 1993, 18-22.
76 Jentleson, Bruce, editor. 1999. Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post–Cold War World. 
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 348.
77 For a discussion of this tension between the tasks of democratization and post-conflict stabilization, which some conflict 
resolution practitioners call the “sequencing dilemma,” see for example Durch, William J., editor. 2006. Twenty-first-
Century Peace Operations. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 11-28 and 573-602.
78 Levinger, Matthew. 2015. “A Core National Security Interest: Framing Atrocities Prevention,” Politics and Governance 
vol. 3, no. 426-27. Available from: http://www.cogitatiopress.com/ojs/index.php/politicsandgovernance/article/view/322 
(accessed 14 January 2016); Finkel, James P. 2014. “Atrocity Prevention at the Crossroads: Assessing the President’s 
Atrocity Prevention Board After Two Years,” Center for the Prevention of Genocide Occasional Papers, No. 2 (Washington, DC: 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum). Available from: http://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20140904-finkel-atrocity-
prevention-report.pdf (accessed 14 January 2016).
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on other national security priorities such as counterterrorism, security cooperation, or 
democracy promotion. Thus its work can help illuminate the cognitive blind spots that 
were evident in the U.S. government’s analysis of Rwandan politics before the genocide.79
 
Despite this important progress, the broader historical record of recent years—including the 
commission of mass atrocities across large areas of Africa and the Middle East—suggests that 
much still remains to be accomplished. Both of the factors that impaired U.S. government officials’ 
understanding of Rwanda in 1993-1994—faulty cognitive framing and rigid policy guidance—have 
continued to impede U.S. atrocity prevention efforts in recent years.
Faulty Cognitive Framing
Just as the civil war frame led U.S. officials to underestimate the risk of mass violence against 
Rwandan civilians in 1994, faulty framing has played a role in shaping U.S. policy toward North 
Africa and the Middle East since the Arab Spring, as well as toward the newly independent nation of 
South Sudan. For example, after the fall of Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi in 2011, President 
Obama and other senior U.S. officials applied a cognitive frame focusing on “democratization” to 
the Libyan political transition, discounting evidence of growing threats of instability and danger 
to civilians. 
After rebel forces seized control of Tripoli in September 2011, President Obama congratulated 
the people of Libya on “writing a new chapter in the life of their nation” by building “a future that 
is free and democratic and prosperous.”80 By the following year, prospects for peace and security 
in Libya had turned bleak. In September 2012, the U.S. Ambassador to Libya was assassinated in 
Benghazi, and the International Crisis Group warned that Libya was devolving into “a country 
of regions and localities pulling in different directions, beset by intercommunal strife and where 
well-armed groups freely roam.”81 But President Obama remained upbeat. In his speech to the UN 
General Assembly that month, he declared:
[E]ven as there will be huge challenges to come with a transition to democracy, I am 
convinced that ultimately government of the people, by the people, and for the people is 
more likely to bring about the stability, prosperity, and individual opportunity that serve as 
a basis for peace in our world. So let us remember that this is a season of progress.82
With respect to South Sudan, U.S. and other international donors framed the situation 
principally in terms of the challenges of state-building and “post-conflict reconstruction.” Unlike 
Rwanda, which had attracted meager foreign assistance or high-level diplomatic attention during 
the early 1990s, the new republic of South Sudan received billions of dollars of aid and intense 
international scrutiny after achieving independence from Sudan in July 2011. Organizations 
including the U.S. government, the UN, and international human rights groups closely monitored 
developments in Sudan and South Sudan, watching for trouble signs in the disputed border 
territories of Abyei and South Kordofan, in the pastoralist grazing corridors of Jonglei and Unity 
states, and in other regions. 
79 Finkel, “Atrocity Prevention at the Crossroads”; Finkel, James P. 2015. “Moving Beyond the Crossroads: Strengthening 
the Atrocity Prevention Board,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 9, 2: 138-47, available from: http://
scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1361&context=gsp (accessed 14 January 2016); Alleblas, Tessa 
and Eamon Aloyo, Sarah Brockmeier, Philipp Rotmann, Jon Western. 2015.“Syria and Beyond: Assessing the Obama 
Administration’s Atrocity Prevention Board,” The Hague Institute for Global Justice, unpublished ms.
80 Obama, Barack. 2011. Remarks by President Obama at United Nations High-Level Meeting on Libya, 20 September. 
Available from: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/20/remarks-president-obama-high-level-meeting-
libya (accessed 14 January 2016).
81 International Crisis Group. Divided We Stand: Libya’s Enduring Conflicts. Middle East/North Africa Report No. 130, 14 
September 2012. Available from: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/130-
divided-we-stand-libyas-enduring-conflicts.aspx (accessed 14 January 2016).
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Nonetheless, the implosion of the South Sudanese government in December 2013, when a civil 
war erupted between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir and those loyal to Vice President Riek 
Machar, took most international observers by surprise. In the words of peacekeeping expert Alison 
Giffen: 
The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) had focused its protection efforts on early 
warning, prevention, and support to the government of South Sudan to fulfill the state’s 
responsibility to protect its people. But while Security Council members backed this 
strategy, they didn’t adequately invest in its success through coordinated pressure on the 
government of South Sudan to make reforms that could have prevented this crisis. This 
approach to protecting civilians turned out to be foolishly idealistic and wholly inadequate 
when government forces turned against their own citizens, opposition and irregular forces 
rose up to join in the abuses, and communities committed crimes against their neighbors.83
A study on U.S. atrocity prevention efforts since 2011 found analogous shortcomings in the 
U.S. government’s analytical work on this crisis: “The APB and others had devoted considerable 
time over the months preceding the current political crisis to the potential threat of atrocities in 
South Sudan, but focused on Jonglei State and elsewhere where there was inter-ethnic violence 
rather than on Juba itself.”84
In both of these cases, international policymakers fell prey to the same type of cognitive 
failures that had characterized the response to the Rwandan genocide. After the defeat and killing 
of Qaddafi in 2011, the Libyan civil war was lauded as a successful “transition to democracy.” 
President Obama and other international leaders disregarded signs of the country’s political 
unraveling and growing civilian insecurity. After South Sudan achieved its independence, the UN 
and other international donors oriented their policies around the objectives of state-building and 
“post-conflict reconstruction.” They paid little heed to the possibility that the country’s leaders—
who had for decades fought in militias against, as well as alongside, each other—might take up 
arms in a new civil war.
Rigid Policy Guidance
In cases of faulty cognitive framing, the inability to see a situation clearly can inhibit one’s ability 
to act effectively to address it. Rigid policy guidance can contribute to the converse phenomenon: 
the unwillingness to act can render one unable to see. In 2006, President Bill Clinton belatedly 
acknowledged that he had not been “alive” to events in Rwanda during the genocide. Because 
Clinton had ruled out supporting an international intervention to stop the violence, officials in his 
administration shied away from discussing the events in Rwanda too precisely—for example by 
avoiding public use of the word “genocide.”
This same tone of studied evasion may be found in some of President Obama’s pronouncements 
on recent crises in North Africa and the Middle East. Obama came into office determined to end 
his predecessor’s wars in the Middle East and Asia, not to begin new ones. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
when discussing situations in which he has decided not to intervene, he has steered clear of using 
language that would imply the need for vigorous American action. Thus, in September 2012, he 
saw a “season of progress” in Libya, even as other observers saw a nation on the brink of chaos. 
With respect to the Syrian civil war, this pattern has been even more striking. At the rare 
moments when Obama has advocated a muscular response to the Assad regime’s atrocities—
notably in the wake of its 2013 chemical weapons attacks on Syrian civilians—he has spoken 
vividly and forcefully about the human suffering in the country.85 But apart from his speeches 
about chemical weapons, Obama publicly discussed the Syrian crisis only five times in speeches 
83 Giffen, Alison. 2014. “How the UN Should Handle South Sudan,” CNN, February 5. Available from: http://
globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2014/02/05/how-the-u-n-should-handle-south-sudan/ (accessed 14 January 2016).
84 Finkel, “Atrocity Prevention at the Crossroads,” 22. See also Alleblas, Aloyo, Brockmeier, Rotmann, and Western, 
“Assessment of U.S. Atrocity Prevention Efforts,” 6.
85 Levinger, “A Core National Security Interest: Framing Atrocities Prevention,” 37.
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and presidential statements delivered between April 2011 and August 2014. The longest of these 
statements was 700 words; most were considerably shorter. For example, in his annual address to 
the UN General Assembly of September 2011, Obama devoted two paragraphs to discussing Syria. 
On the same occasion the following year, Obama devoted three paragraphs to the Syrian conflict, 
declaring that “the regime of Bashar al-Assad must come to an end so that the suffering of the 
Syrian people can stop and a new dawn can begin.”86 
Like the Rwandan genocide, the crises in Libya, South Sudan, and Syria were all intractable 
conflicts that posed difficult challenges for international policymakers. Even the most robust and 
enlightened policies would have had no guarantee of success, and might have given rise to perverse 
unintended consequences. But any effective decision-making process must orient the policy to 
address the facts on the ground, rather than reengineer the facts to meet the policy prescriptions. 
In order to achieve any desired change, we must begin by paying attention to the problem. We 
must be alive to the possibilities, both positive and negative. We must recognize that issues of 
grand strategy and global security cannot be divorced from the mandate to defend individual 
human lives.
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